Consisting of an agglomeration of nationalities, dominated for centuries by a race of proud warriors, Ethiopia is the only African state that has managed to maintain its independence even in the face of European colonialism. Western powers have had to treat this most ancient state with respect, and some, beating their heads against it, have lost their horns. But if military strength and geographical position have allowed Ethiopia to avoid the horrors of colonisation for a long time, on the other hand they also ensured that the barbarity of feudalism was passed down to the present day, curbing the productive forces and preventing the formation of a true entrepreneurial bourgeoisie and a strong urban proletariat.

Its geographical position is the determining reason for the isolation in which this region has found itself for centuries, and for its particular history. The mountains of Ethiopia rise with very steep walls up to two thousand, three thousand metres; on the summit of these formidable natural fortresses stretches the plateau that is the most fertile and most populated area. Right in the middle of this plateau are the sources of great rivers such as the Blue Nile, the Juba, the Shabelle, the Omo, etc.

Over the centuries, several peoples competed for dominance in this fertile region; on the other hand, it was relatively easy for the inhabitants to defend themselves and subjugate the more primitive populations below. Until the Italian invasion of 1936, no one had ever succeeded in its complete conquest (this is certainly not ‘to the greater glory of Italian arms’, but it is a victory of modern technology against an outdated mode of production). Persians, Arabs, Turks, have in successive epochs threatened the region, but have at best succeeded in pushing their way to the foot of the highlands, never in conquering it. In fact, the Muslim religion spread throughout Eritrea and the lowlands, while the populations of the interior always retained the Christian-Coptic religion.

The first Europeans to visit Ethiopia were Portuguese navigators. The news they brought back about this legendary empire, ‘the bulwark of Christianity in Africa’, led to the establishment of tenuous diplomatic relations between the papacy and the emperor of Ethiopia, which however had no effect.

The introduction of Christianity in Ethiopia dates back to 320 A.D.; it coincides with a centralisation of imperial authority; it was in fact the emperor Ezana himself who, after having subjected the entire region to his authority, favoured the introduction of the new religion, which lent itself well to the purpose because it sanctioned and justified imperial authority, proclaiming that it derived from God.

The end of Ethiopia’s isolation is had with the penetration of European capitalist states into the Red Sea, the beginning of which is marked by the opening of the Suez Canal and by the settling of the British in Aden. The imperialist powers throw themselves like vultures upon the conquest of Africa and the Middle East. Even the Italian bourgeoisie, fresh from having achieved, as we know, its national independence, wants to take part in the banquet; but it has arrived late and must gnaw on the hardest bone; so hard that in biting it it will break its teeth.

In order to subjugate Ethiopia, the Western powers tried to leverage a perennial situation of political instability, that is on internal struggles due to the fact that the emperor’s state power was not solid and centralised. Ethiopia was in fact divided into large provinces, at the head of each of which stood a hereditary governor: the Negus (king). Each Negus had under him several Ras; each Ras commanded several Dejazmach. The emperor was called Negusa Nagast (king of kings). His authority derived from the fact that he was the military and religious leader of the nation, and above all from the fact that he was the strongest feudal lord. Each Negus, each Ras, etc. performed state functions in the area entrusted to him on behalf of the emperor, absolute master of the land; he collected taxes, judged, organised and commanded the soldiers. Each of them therefore had a small army, more or less substantial depending on the wealth of the Region (i.e. depending on the number of inhabitants a given territory could sustain). The dominant nation, the Amhara, was exclusively dedicated to the use of arms, and only to them were reserved the places in this complex military hierarchy that stretched from the Emperor down to the foot soldiers.

The weight of all this social scaffolding rested solely on the shoulders of those who cultivated the land: the subjugated populations and the slaves captured in wars or raids.

Theoretically, any appointment of a governor was the exclusive prerogative of the Emperor, but in practice, a deposed Ras defended himself with arms because the loss of his place in the military hierarchy meant the loss of all means of livelihood for himself and his family. In fact, all military leaders lived off the taxes they managed to collect in their allotted area: at every level of the hierarchy a deposed leader could suddenly go from wealth to misery. On the death of an Emperor, a political upheaval almost always ensued; in fact, if one Negus felt strong enough, he would proclaim himself Emperor; the others would take sides with one or the other pretender; the matter would be settled on the battlefield, and naturally, an upheaval of the entire hierarchy would follow. Western powers therefore sought to exploit the rivalries between the various leaders to their own advantage, and to weaken the unity of the Empire.

At the Berlin Congress of 1885 the partition of Africa is decided. In the same year the Italians begin the occupation of Eritrea. They try to further the throne aspirations of Negus Menelik, King of Shewa, by supplying him with arms and technical assistance. But in 1887 arrives the first cold shower for the imperialist ambitions of the Italian bourgeoisie: Negusa Negast Yohannes sends one of his Ras against the Italians, who at Dogali annihilates an entire Italian battalion.

In 1889 Emperor Yohannes dies in battle, and Menelik II, the most powerful Negus, proclaims himself emperor. In the same year Italy and Ethiopia conclude the famous Treaty of Wuchale; a treaty of ‘perpetual friendship’ that was to enshrine Italy’s protectorate over Ethiopia. To get an idea of the rapacity and charlatanry of the Italian bourgeoisie, it is enough to consider that Article 17 of this treaty, in the Italian text, says that the emperor consents to be represented by Italy in its relations with other states (which is the same as giving up its independence), while in the Amharic text it says that the emperor can make use of Italy, etc. A vulgar trick that gave rise to a series of controversies and which Italian imperialism uses as a pretext to intervene by force.

In 1893, after Menelik had denounced the Treaty of Wuchale, Italian troops occupy Tigray. The pompous propaganda of the Italian bourgeoisie presents this undertaking as a ‘noble civilising mission’. But it had miscalculated: in 1896 at Adwa (capital of Tigray) the Italian expeditionary corps, 20,000 strong, is almost totally destroyed by Menelik’s armies. This victory has much resonance as a warning to the other colonial powers, inducing them to rein in their appetites.

Contact with the imperialist powers had also introduced the marvels of modern technology to this thousand-year-old empire. Firearms were naturally the product that the various Ras and Neguses appreciated most, because they immediately understood their usefulness. But then, between 1887 and the early 1900s, came the post office, the telephone, the telegraph, the first bank, the first railway, and the first automobiles. The ancient social structure was still standing, but the first germs that would cause its destruction were beginning to penetrate. The threat of powerful and aggressive external enemies demanded moreover the centralisation of the state under a single command, that is, the end of the struggles between the various feudal lords, and their submission to the central authority.

The centralisation of the state, begun under Menelik II, was continued by Ras Tafari who in 1917, after a period of infighting following Menelik’s death, had assumed the title of Regent. In 1923 (when Ethiopia joined the League of Nations) Ras Tafari issued an edict condemning to death anyone who bought or sold slaves; in 1924 he decreed that all children must be born free. For a long time, however, these edicts remained a dead letter, because much of production was still based on slavery and its abolition required an economic and social transformation.

Ras Tafari also devoted particular attention to the formation of an army equipped and framed in the European manner; to this end, he made use of foreign instructors and sent the first young men of the aristocracy to study at Western military academies. This reform policy, naturally, did not please the great feudal lords, but they did not have the strength to oppose Ras Tafari’s army.

In 1928, he had himself proclaimed Negus, and in 1930 he was lavishly crowned emperor, taking the name Haile Selassie (Blessed by the Trinity). All of Haile Selassie’s efforts were consistently aimed at undermining the authority of the great feudal lords and strengthening central power. One of the means he employed was to keep the feudal lords at his court, while simultaneously undermining their authority in the provinces by appointing his own direct emissaries to govern them (just like Louis XIV in France).

But the biggest blow to the feudal lords came in 1931, when Haile Selassie promulgated the first Constitution, enacted, the text says, ‘without anyone having requested it, by Our will’.

And it’s clear that no one had asked for it! There is no mention of the chiefs and their function, but stipulates that the title of Negusa Nagast must only come ‘from the lineage of Haile Selassie I, a lineage descended in succession from Menelik I, born of Solomon, king of Jerusalem, and the queen of Ethiopia called the Queen of Sheba’. An entire chapter was dedicated to the powers of the Negusa Nagast, who was to hold ‘all supreme power in his hands’.

The Constitution also provided for the formation of two Chambers of Councils to make laws and to legislate, both appointed by the Emperor. In addition, a state budget was established for the first time. Monetary circulation, however, remained derisory for a long time; rents were mostly paid in kind. In the Amharic language there is no word for ‘money’, but the word ‘silver’ or a word derived from Arabic is used (see E. Giurco: ‘Ordinamento politico dell’Impero Etiopico’). This naturally scandalised the standard-bearers of bourgeois ‘civilisation’.

Up until 1931 and beyond, the only circulating currency was the ‘Thaler of Maria Theresa’ (minted in Vienna) and ‘sali’ (small parallelepipeds of salt). This currency was not yet ‘capital’ but only a medium of exchange; suffice it to say that silver thalers were used by Ethiopian goldsmiths as raw material to make their jewellery. Also in 1931, the Bank of Abyssinia, which had been established in 1905 and operated with European capital, was nationalised with compensation and became the National Bank of Ethiopia.

The brief interlude of Italian occupation (1936-41) accelerates economic and social transformation, the first industries are established, ways of communication and trade are developed. Slavery is abolished, but the social structure in the countryside, the rights of the nobility over land, remains in place.

At the end of the war, the British do not occupy Ethiopia, despite having, so to speak, the ‘right of war’, given that it was a former Italian colony. Haile Selassie resumes his post. There is no shortage of protests on the part of the Italian bourgeoisie: in 1946 De Gasperi maintains, with virginal candour, that the Italian undertaking in Ethiopia had been a civilising mission and demanded that the ‘tutelage’ of the former colony be at least partly entrusted to Italy.

In 1952, following an agreement with the British, Eritrea federatively unites with Ethiopia. In 1962, Eritrea loses all its autonomy and becomes a mere province of the Empire. It is from this date that the Eritrean independence movement is born and develops.

Economic development has not formed a strong entrepreneurial bourgeoisie; however, it has given rise to a radical petty bourgeoisie, intellectuals, students, and army officers who are advocates for the introduction of modern relations of production. In 1960, an attempted revolt by the officers of the imperial guard is bloodily suppressed.

It wasn’t until September 1974 that Ethiopia arrived at the bourgeois revolution.

However, the Derg (Revolutionary Military Committee), representing bourgeois interests, proceeded, however, in a contradictory manner. It overthrew and imprisoned Haile Selassie, but only proclaimed the Republic seven months later. It arrested the notables of the former Empire, but also the trade union leaders, and fired on the workers and peasants. It did not grant autonomy to the nationalities oppressed for centuries, nor did not proclaim agrarian reform except when it found itself in high water. In short, it acted in a revolutionary manner toward absolutism, and in a reactionary manner toward the workers and peasants.

In the Amharic language, land is referred to by the word ‘resti’, which means: ‘collective property derived from conquest’. The lineage that has the right of use over the land is referred to by the word ‘restegnà’, which means: ‘proprietary lineage descended from the conquerors’. The meaning of these two words encapsulates the entire social system in the Ethiopian countryside, which has been handed down to the present day. Until after World War II, capitalist-type property did not exist, or existed only to an insignificant extent.

The soil in most of Ethiopia is characterised by high natural fertility and a wide variety of climates. The high natural fertility is evidenced, for instance, by the fact that this region is one of the richest in livestock in the whole of Africa. These are mostly reared in the wild, i.e. they feed on the spontaneous products of the soil.

Over the centuries, various peoples have vied for dominance of this ‘promised land’. The Amhara emerged victorious and imposed their rule over the entire Region. This warrior race, which regarded productive labour an unworthy occupation, was divided into a complex military hierarchy headed by the emperor.

Only the emperor was the absolute master of the land. He delegated his rights to the various ranks of the military hierarchy, who held the privilege of extracting as many taxes as possible from the peasants; taxes that were naturally paid in kind or in labour. In return, these military chiefs had to pay tribute to the emperor and performed administrative and military functions in the area entrusted to them.

The offices of Negus, Ras, or Dejazmach could be revoked by the emperor at any time, but in the course of time they became hereditary, i.e. remained within the same family.

The local nobility was made up of the Gultegna, who held functions similar to our own medieval barons. Their fiefdom was called a ‘gult’ and derived from a concession by the Negusa Nagast, whereby the Gultegna family could retain a tenth of the tribute collected in the area, have a tenth of the fief’s land cultivated for their exclusive benefit, confiscate the land of those who did not pay their taxes; in the case of land division, they would be awarded a tenth of the land as tax.

Whereas in the case of the Ras or Negus one cannot speak of hereditary property, but of hereditary military rank, here we are faced with the formation of a property, but it is not yet property of the individual type, because it is the whole family that enjoys the benefits of the Gult.

Until the Italian occupation (1936), no one could have land rights other than members of the Amhara race; no foreigner, no Western company could therefore freely buy land. It was permitted to sell one’s right to use the land, but in that case, half the sale price had to be paid as tax to the emperor’s local representative.

It can be said that Ethiopian law did not admit purchase but only conquest. In fact, Western scholars, who in examining the political organisation of Ethiopia busied themselves with researching what the ‘sources of law’ were, had to conclude, horrified, that it derived solely from force. For more than a century, Marxism had already affirmed that force is the source, the origin of every right and every privilege, especially where the codes are the most refined. Let us add that such a ‘discovery’ was one of the arguments used to justify the Italian conquest.

The weight of the entire social scaffolding rested on the slaves (prisoners of war and their descendants) and on the subjugated populations (Galla or Oromo, Wolloye, Dankali or Afar, Somali, etc.) devoted to agriculture and pastoralism.

Slavery, despite the more or less sincere efforts made by Menelik II and Haile Selassie to abolish it, remained in place until the Italian occupation. Raiding and selling slaves was the main occupation of many Ras: the Fetha Negast (Book of Kings) states that ‘the law of war and victory make the vanquished slaves of the victors’. Slave labour was also of considerable importance in many regions.

The Italian occupation abolished slavery, built roads, gave impetus to the cities, and installed the first manufactories; but the privileges enjoyed by the local nobility in the countryside were not abolished and have been handed down to the present day.

The productive forces were compressed under an age-old despotism, and their development could not occur without the violent breakdown of social relations. Therefore, alongside the emergence of the first modern industries and farms, a system of feudal privileges has remained in place until today, weighing on the peasant’s shoulders and hindering the development of the productive forces. Even in 1966, only 10% of the land was cultivated; 7% was forest; 57% meadows and pastures, and as much as 26% lay uncultivated.

Yet agriculture provides 64% of the gross national product. The livestock population is one of the richest in the whole of Africa: in 1969-70 there were 26 million heads of cattle, 12,700 thousand sheep, 1,400 thousand horses, 1,400 thousand mules, 3,900 thousand donkeys (UN Statistical Yearbook 1971).

Means of communication are extremely poor; in 1965 there were only 6,300 km of roads and about 1,000 km of railways, 24,000 cars, 8,900 industrial vehicles, just 54 post offices, 28,000 telephones. All this in a country of 26 million inhabitants, almost four times the size of Italy.

Another statistic that shows the very low level of industrialisation is that of the production of electrical energy, only 341,000 kW in 1969, compared to that of Egypt, for example, which is certainly not an industrialised country, of over 4 million kW. To this must be added the fact that the mountainous terrain, rich in large rivers, would offer great possibilities for hydroelectric energy production.

The few mining or agricultural processing industries are almost all in the hands of foreigners, mainly Italians. There are less than 400,000 workers.

A census of the land and population has never been taken, but according to the latest estimates, it appears that before the reform decreed on 4 March 1975, the distribution of land was as follows: 24% to the feudal lords; on these lands worked 60% of the population, i.e. about 15 million inhabitants. They had to pay a rent equal to 75% or more of the produce. Some of these estates reached enormous sizes (600-800 thousand hectares).

16% belonged to the emperor’s family (the most fertile lands). 60% was cultivated communally by some 7 million peasants.

To date, no real entrepreneurial bourgeoisie has been formed and, as has happened in many backward countries, (Egypt, Algeria, Libya, etc.) it is the army, the only organised force, that constitutes the ‘party of the bourgeoisie’, meaning it assumes the task of overthrowing feudalism and implementing economic transformation in a capitalist sense.

The Derg is therefore the legitimate representative of Ethiopia’s national bourgeoisie. It is a young bourgeoisie, just born, but one that already shows a reactionary face. The Derg overthrew the absolute monarchy, but as soon as it was confronted with striking workers, it responded to their demands with lead. It did the same with the peasants, and only the necessities of war, only the spread of separatism among the various peoples, only the fear of losing Eritrea, its only outlet to the sea, drove it, beyond its original intentions, to proclaim agrarian reform.

The Derg has at its disposal an army of only a few tens of thousands of men, absolutely insufficient to control such a large country with such poor communications.

Secessionist pressures have multiplied in recent times. Populations that for centuries have been subjugated to the Amhara are now demanding autonomy.

Only one alternative remains: mobilise the peasants and throw them against the secessionists. But what interest would the peasants have in defending a regime that has done nothing for them? This is the reason why the Derg decided to proclaim such a radically formulated agrarian reform.

The reform, decreed on 4 March 1975, provides in fact (‘l’Unità’ and ‘Le Monde’ of 5 March): 1) that all lands pass without compensation into state ownership;
2) that the feudal rights of the nobility and the Church be abolished;
3) the cancellation of all peasant debts;
4) the distribution of land to those who work it in plots of no more than 10 ha, or else in co-operative form to village communities;
5) the prohibition of the employment of wage-labourers;
6) the prohibition of the buying and selling of land. No one will henceforth be allowed to own land privately;
7) that the measure be declared valid for all Regions (therefore also for Eritrea)

It is a reform decreed out of the necessity of war. This is not a new fact; in many cases the bourgeoisie, needing the peasants, has deluded them with the prospect of agrarian reform; always, however, in the end it has always cheated them. At best, the peasants, freed from the yoke of the feudal lord, fell under that of the usurer, the merchant, or the rich peasant.

Land is not enough! Livestock, tools, machinery are needed, and of this, at least as far as we know, the reform decreed by the Derg is silent. A clear sign that the Ethiopian bourgeoisie has no intention at all of putting its proclamations into practice.

For a better understanding, it is enough to recall the measures that were implemented by revolutionary Russia. In the Decree on Land passed by the Soviets in Russia in October 1917, it states: ‘1. Landed proprietorship is abolished forthwith without any compensation.
‘2. The landed estates, as also all crown, monastery, and church lands, with all their livestock, implements, buildings and everything pertaining thereto, shall be placed at the disposal of the volost land committees and the uyezd Soviets of Peasants' Deputies pending the convocation of the Constituent Assembly’.

In the Land Law passed in September 1918, it states: ‘2. The land passes over to the use to the entire labouring population without any compensation, open or secret, to the former owners. ‘3. The right to use the land belongs to those who till it by their own labour (...) ‘6. All private livestock and inventoried property of non-labouring homesteads pass over without indemnification to the disposition (in accordance with their character) of the land departments of the county, provincial, regional, and Federal Soviets. ‘7. All homestead constructions mentioned in Article 6, as well as all agricultural appurtenances, pass over to the disposition (in accordance with their character) of the county, provincial, regional, and Federal Soviets without indemnification. ‘18. The trade in agricultural machinery and in seeds is monopolised by the organs of the Soviet power’.

Even in the reform proclaimed by the Derg, the revolutionary principle is established that land belongs to all the people and is given for use to those who work it, but even this is not enough: every declaration of principle is destined to remain a heap of words if not put into practice.

Indeed, the implementation of the reform presents great difficulties of a technical nature, but above all, the obstacle to be overcome is the resistance of the landowners. As soon as the proclamation of the reform became known, they took to the bush with their armed bands and will defend their privileges by force.

The poor Ethiopian peasants must therefore defend themselves against two enemies: on the one hand against the bourgeoisie which, after having used them, will abandon them to their fate once it no longer needs them. On the other, against the landowners who do not want to give up their privileges.

What guarantees do the peasants have that the reform will really be implemented? Only one, to arm themselves and unite in autonomous organisations.

Lenin, in a speech to the First All-Russian Congress of Peasant Deputies in May 1917, states:

‘I and my Party comrades, in whose name I have the honour to speak, know of only two ways of protecting the interests of agricultural labourers and poor peasants, and we recommend these two ways to the Peasants’ Soviet for its attention. The first way is to organise the agricultural labourers and poor peasants. We should like, and we advise it, to have in each peasant committee, in each volost, uyezd and gubernia, a separate group of agricultural labourers and poor peasants who will have to ask themselves: “If the land becomes the property of the whole people tomorrow – and it certainly will, because the people want it to – then where do we come in? Where shall we, who have no animals or implements, get them from? How are we to farm the land? How must we protect our interests? How are we to make sure that the land, which will belong to the whole people, which will really be the property of the nation, should not fall only into the hands of proprietors? If it falls into the hands of those who own enough animals and implements, shall we gain anything by it? Is that what we made this great revolution for? (...)”

‘There is only one way to escape the yoke of capitalism and ensure that the people’s land goes to the working people, and that is by organising the agricultural labourers, who will be guided by their experience, their observations and their distrust of what the village sharks tell them, even though these sharks wear red rosettes in their buttonholes and call themselves “revolutionary democrats”. The poor peasants can only be taught by independent organisation in the localities, they can only learn from their own experience. That experience will not be easy, we cannot and do not promise them a land flowing with milk and honey. The landowners will be thrown out because the people wish it, but capitalism will remain. It is much more difficult to do away with capitalism, and the road to its overthrow is a different one. It is the road of independent, separate organisation of the agricultural labourers and the poor peasants. And that is what our Party proposes in the first instance. Only this road promises a gradual, difficult, but real and certain transfer of the land to the working people (...)

‘The second stop which our Party recommends is that every big economy, for example, every big landed estate, of which there are 30,000 in Russia, should be organised as soon as possible into a model farm for the common cultivation of the land jointly by agricultural labourers and scientifically trained agronomists, using the animals, implements, etc.’

We note that from the moment this reform was enacted, all the newspapers (including those of the opportunist parties), previously so eager to report even on the former emperor’s health, have drawn a curtain of silence over the events in Ethiopia. Certainly, it is uncomfortable for the Western bourgeoisie, which has not even been able to nationalise the land, to realise that precisely from such a backward nation come radically formulated measures. The realisation is even more uncomfortable for the false communist parties, who daily kneel before the image of property and weep at the deathbed of the national economy.

The Ethiopian bourgeoisie certainly has no intention of keeping its promises. It merely wants to raise the peasants just enough to save the unity of the former empire, only to deceive them as every bourgeoisie of the world has done in turn. But social forces cannot be commanded with a flick of the wrist and, in certain situations, even words, even statements of principle can act as the detonator that sets off the bomb of social contradictions. These are latent not only in Ethiopia, but in Sudan, Congo, South Africa, Rhodesia, and all of Africa. We hope it will soon be ignited by the fire of class struggle.